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Abstract and Keywords
The Middle East’s pivotal position in a hydrocarbon-based global capitalism carries enor­
mous ramifications for the region and the Gulf Arab states in particular. This chapter 
aims to present key debates associated with this transformation. It begins with an 
overview of the Rentier State Theory (RST). RST theorists foreground the impact of oil 
rents on Gulf states, drawing causal relationships between these rents and the character­
istics of the Gulf’s political economy. The chapter turns to a critique of some of its core 
assumptions, notably its theorization of state and class. It argues that a more satisfactory 
understanding of the political economy of oil in the Gulf can be found through a return to 
the categories of class and capitalism, and a deeper appreciation of the ways in which the 
Gulf is located in the wider dynamics of accumulation in the world market.
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Beginning in the first decades of the twentieth century and through to the aftermath of 
the Second World War, a fundamental shift took place in the world’s energy regime. From 
a system of industrial production based primarily on coal, this period marked a transition 
to oil and gas as the principle fuels underpinning manufacturing, industry, and transport. 
Oil and gas were considerably more energy efficient than coal, and their portability made 
them ideal fuels for automobiles and airplanes. New chemical industries based on the 
production of synthetic and inorganic commodities—plastics, synthetic fibers, detergents, 
fertilizers, and so forth—shifted away from using coal as a feedstock towards oil and gas, 
enabling an expansion in production and productivity (indeed, the term “petrochemicals” 
first emerged at this time to signify this shift).1 Significantly, the Second World War had 
also demonstrated the superiority of oil-powered militaries—US output of gasoline for 
military use at the end of the war was about eighteen times greater than at the begin­
ning, and that of aviation gasoline about eighty times greater.2 In 1949, oil and gas had 
accounted for 53% of all energy used in the United States. By 1960, this was to rise to 
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72%.3 Not only did these hydrocarbons enable a radical reworking in the nature of pro­
duction, transport, and war-making, they were also considered “politically more reliable;” 
coal miners had formed one of the most militant sections of labor unions through the 
decades before the war.4 Furthermore, the significance of oil and gas extended beyond 
their utility as fuels and feedstocks. Associated with the sale of these commodities on the 
world market was the potential accumulation of enormous financial surpluses. The redi­
rection of these surpluses into the developing financial circuits of the new global capital­
ism—most particularly US treasuries, European and North American financial institu­
tions, and the international debt markets that were to form through the 1970s and 1980s
—was a crucially enabling factor in how these circuits grew.5 So-called “petrodollars” 
continue to be a central pivot of global financial architecture into the contemporary peri­
od.
Initially, much of the postwar demand for oil and gas was supplied by the United States 
and Europe. By the mid-1960s, however, the world’s principal supplies of cheap and ac­
cessible hydrocarbons were to be found in the Middle East—notably in Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Iraq, Iran, and the smaller Gulf states of Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the seven 
sheikhdoms that would eventually become the United Arab Emirates. The first oil well 
was drilled in Bahrain in 1931, with exploration and commercial export massively expand­
ing through the decades following the Second World War. By 1969 the Middle East’s oil 
production exceeded that of North America and Europe; by the mid-1970s, it would be 
equivalent to their combined total.6 For this reason, political domination of the Gulf and 
wider Middle East was an essential element to how the postwar international states sys­
tem developed—as numerous authors have analyzed in detail, the emergence of a US-
dominated global capitalism was to a great extent premised on Western control of the re­
gion.7 Despite the availability of alternative sources of oil in recent years—such as North 
American shale reserves—the Middle East remains key to the world energy markets, ac­
counting for more than half of proven oil reserves and nearly one-third of oil production, 
and 47% of proven gas reserves.8
The Middle East’s pivotal position in a hydrocarbon-based global capitalism carries enor­
mous ramifications for the region as a whole, and the Gulf Arab states in particular. In 
just a few short decades, social relations in the Gulf had undergone a dramatic shift, from 
an economy based largely on pearling, entrepot trade, and some agriculture, into a core 
zone of the global political economy. The aim of this chapter is to present a survey of 
some of the key debates associated with this transformation. To this end, the chapter be­
gins with an overview of an influential perspective known as Rentier State Theory (RST), 
which has been described as “one of the major contributions of Middle East regional stud­
ies to political science.”9 Rentier State theorists foreground the impact of oil rents on Gulf 
states, drawing causal relationships between these rents and the characteristics of the 
Gulf’s political economy. Employing a theoretical understanding of state and society 
drawn from Weberian sociology, these theorists argue that rents have fostered a pro­
nounced autonomy of the Gulf states from society, allowing the former to dominate and 
shape all other social processes.
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After outlining the principal contentions of RST, the chapter turns to a critique of some of 
its core theoretical assumptions, notably its theorization of state and class. Ultimately, it 
is argued, a more satisfactory understanding of the political economy of oil in the Gulf 
can be found through a return to the categories of class and capitalism, and a deeper ap­
preciation of the ways in which the Gulf is located in the wider dynamics of accumulation 
in the world market. In this manner, the analysis below emphasizes the necessarily inter­
twined processes of class and state formation in the Gulf, tracing how this has shaped 
forms of capital and labor over recent decades. The chapter concludes by assessing the 
implications of such an approach for emerging avenues of critical scholarly work.
Rentier States and the Gulf
Much contemporary work on the political economy of the Gulf builds on the earlier in­
sights of an Iranian economist, Hossein Mahdavy, who wrote a germinal account of the 
impact of oil on Iran’s economy prior to the revolution of 1970. According to Mahdavy, 
Iran was an archetypal example of a rentier state, defined as an economy that received 
“on a regular basis substantial amounts of external rent [which are] rentals paid by for­
eign individuals, concerns or governments to individuals, concerns or governments of a 
given country.”10 Describing these external rents as akin to “a free gift of nature or as a 
grant from foreign sources,”11 Mahdavy argued that they produced a particularly distort­
ed pattern of economic development. Notably, they enabled the Iranian government to 
embark on large spending programs without having to resort to taxation—a situation that 
Mahdavy characterized as “fortuitous étatisme.” As a consequence of this particular eco­
nomic structure—regular capital inflows with little need to extract wealth from alterna­
tive industrial or productive activities—Mahdavy posited that rentier states would be in­
clined to spend on consumption rather than pursue industrial diversification.12 This, in 
turn, would accentuate the gap between those sectors connected to oil rent and other in­
dustries; while “considerable government expenditure (usually in a few cities) [create] an 
impression of prosperity and growth, the mass of the population may remain in a back­
ward state and the most important factors for long-run growth may receive little or no at­
tention at all.”13
From this standpoint, Mahdavy, and later RST-influenced scholars, highlighted the pres­
ence of external rents to explain the social, political, and economic characteristics of re­
source-rich countries. But while Mahdavy’s analysis warned of the potentially negative 
impact that rents could have on economic development, he was nonetheless careful to 
avoid determinist readings—emphasizing that governments could pursue alternative 
paths that prioritized industrialization and support of education and training.14 
Subsequent interpretations of RST, however, have tended to adopt a much more deter­
ministic approach to the effects of oil-derived rents on politics, economics, and even the 
behavior of individual citizens. In an extremely influential account, for example, Beblawi 
and Luciani (1987) highlight the impact of “no taxation” and state largesse in rentier 
states on citizen attitudes. They argue that in the absence of any pressure to engage in 
“productive activities,” citizens tend to lack the spirit of entrepreneurialism and are sus­
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ceptible to a “rentier mentality” in which the state is expected to provide for their needs 
in return for their political passivity.15 Similarly, other authors have claimed a causal cor­
relation between reliance on rent and political autocracy.16 Ross, for example, contends 
that there are few “pressures for greater accountability” in rentier states due to the ab­
sence (or low levels) of taxation, and thus little incentive for groups to challenge estab­
lished powers.17 In this manner, Ross argues that rentierism promoted three key effects: 
a “rentier effect,” in which the lack of taxation encouraged political quiescence; a “re­
pression effect,” which meant the state’s resources allowed it to fully develop extensive 
repressive capacities; and a “modernization effect,” where rents led to uncompetitive and 
poorly developed economies, and consequently weakened occupational specialization, ed­
ucational attainment, and urban development.18
Among the wider population, rentier-state theorists have also explored the internal dy­
namics of citizenship and its relationship to the state. In this regard, an overriding theme 
is once again the supposed reluctance of the state to create “market incentives for devel­
opment”—instead, the state utilizes its control of rents to “structure relationships with so­
ciety vertically through chains of patronage dependence.”19 Because the allocation and 
circulation of external rents is fully controlled by the Gulf’s ruling families—and access to 
these rents form the primary means of wealth for all social groups—internal competition 
around rent circuits becomes a major preoccupation of citizens. Various corporate enti­
ties, social groups, and individuals, are thus very reluctant “to act economically or politi­
cally on [their] own behalf, let alone seriously criticise the state.”20 The state is able to 
penetrate all spheres of society, using its distributive powers to bind allegiances, incorpo­
rate patronage networks, and mute opposition. One result of this system is a pronounced 
“vertical segmentation,”21 through which various (and ever-shifting) alliances based on 
tribal, religious, ethnic, and other interests are divided from one another and seek to gain 
access to the centrally determined flow of rents—further undermining the potential for 
horizontal forms of cooperation. Running through all these accounts is an analytical em­
phasis on the pronounced autonomy of the state apparatus in the Gulf from wider society. 
Freed from the constraints of taxation and the need to account for societal pressures—
and having differentially incorporated citizens into rent circuits through patterns of verti­
cal segmentation—Gulf monarchies constitute an archetypal “strong state,” with a partic­
ularly enhanced capacity “to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract re­
sources, and appropriate or use resources in determined ways.”22
As noted above, RST remains a particularly influential approach to understanding the 
specificities of Gulf social formations—an approach, moreover, that has found theoretical 
resonance beyond the Middle East (among, for example, studies of mineral-rich African 
states). It has certainly led to some useful insights into the nature of these states, particu­
larly at a comparative level—where different initial institutional arrangements between 
states, ruling families, and corporatist groups have led to different forms of “path depen­
dency,” shaping a variety of social outcomes.23 The close attention to how Gulf state appa­
ratuses are institutionally structured has produced rich and detailed accounts that valu­
ably assist our understanding of political processes in these states. The theory has, 
nonetheless, been subject to a variety of critiques. These have included a questioning of 
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its empirical predictions around political quiescence and the presence of rent24; claims 
that the theory excluded politics and needed to better theorize the interaction between 
exogenous rents and domestic sociopolitical variation25; critiques of its ability to account 
for different state spending policies between the first and second oil booms26; and argu­
ments that RST downplays the political economy of imperialism in the Middle East.27
These and other critiques have spawned numerous subgenres of RST and, indeed, a con­
vincing case can be made that there is no single RST but a variety of theories that have 
emerged in close association with the movement of the price of oil on the world market 
(and hence the level of rents accruing to Gulf states).28
Notwithstanding this variation, a core feature of all RST approaches is a particular theo­
retical conceptualization of the state and class that is drawn from Weberian sociology and 
political science. Framing this perspective are two basic analytical categories—the state 
and “civil society.” Following Weber, the former is defined by its monopoly over the “legit­
imate use of force” within a given territory,29 and consists of the various political institu­
tions that govern a country. The latter is made up of “institutions autonomous from the 
state which facilitate orderly economic, political and social activity.”30 In this manner, the 
Weberian framework posits a strict conceptual division between both categories (often 
expressed as the separation of “politics” and “economics”)31; the state is thus granted a 
wide degree of freedom and latitude to operate as “as a public realm separate from the 
private realm of civil society.”32
It is this assumption of state autonomy—ultimately derived from the “free gift of nature” 
that oil rents provide—which explains the analytical focus of RST on the institutional con­
figuration of the Gulf state. As with the wider Weberian literature in which it is located, 
institutions (specifically those of the state) are considered the determinant, a priori, fac­
tor driving the characteristics of wider social patterns. As a result, within the rentier 
framework, categories such as class and capitalism either disappear from view or are 
considered derivate and subordinate to the policies of the state. The development of capi­
talism is understood as a consequence of the nature and choices of the state apparatus 
(particularly decisions made by the ruling family).
It is striking that virtually all of the debate around RST has focused on assessing its pre­
dictive and descriptive powers, and has generally avoided a critical examination of its ba­
sic theoretical assumptions concerning state and class. This lacuna persists despite the 
rich and ongoing debate around state theory that exists within the wider political econo­
my literature. Within this literature, numerous scholars have argued that the state, as an 
institution, is never independent from the social (class) relations that govern the repro­
duction of any capitalist society. The state is an institutional “form of appearance” of 
these social relations, which acts to maintain the existing class structure, mediates the 
conflicts that inevitably appear between and within classes, and allows these relations to 
reproduce themselves.33 Although the state may appear to us as an independent political 
institution, we need to penetrate below this appearance to grasp the state as a social rela­
tion, which, in the words of the philosopher Bertell Ollman, constitutes a “set of institu­
tional forms through which a ruling class relates to the rest of society.”34 As a conse­
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quence, the relationship that the ruling class holds with the state is actually part of what 
constitutes it as a class; state and class need to be seen as mutually reinforcing and co-
constituted, with the latter providing the conditions of existence for the former.35 An 
analysis of the state, therefore, must begin with an “examination of the ‘anatomy of bour­
geois society,’ that is, an analysis of the specifically capitalist mode of social labour, the 
appropriation of the surplus product and the resulting laws of reproduction of the whole 
social formation, which objectively give rise to the particular political form.”36
This perspective offers an insightful alternative to Rentier State Theory and its under­
standing of the political economy of the Gulf. If the Gulf state is viewed as an institutional 
form of the class relations that typify Gulf societies, then the challenge becomes one of 
tracing how capitalist social relations developed and took the particular form that they 
did in the Gulf (including, of course, the political form). Methodologically, this alternative 
standpoint redirects analytical attention towards the categories of class and capitalism, 
which have largely dropped from view within the RST literature’s focus on the state. Im­
portant questions that subsequently arise include: who constitutes the capitalist class in 
the Gulf? How did this class originate and how is its accumulation structured? How is the 
formation of labor connected to the dominance of capital? How does the political form of 
the Gulf state mediate the relationships of power between labor and capital? How are 
these relationships located within the wider global political economy as well as regional 
processes? Obviously oil revenues and the concomitant development of the state will form 
a central part to answering these and similar questions, but an emphasis on the inter­
twined processes of class and state formation brings to the fore the relations of power 
that underlie the political economy of the Gulf.
Capital in the Gulf
How then, can the notion of a “capitalist class” be conceptualized with respect to the Gulf 
states? The first aspect to note is that class formation in the Gulf needs to be located 
alongside and within the wider development of the world market in the postwar period. 
Viewed from this perspective, Gulf capitalism is not a self-enclosed space that can be un­
derstood simply through features that are considered “internal” to it (such as the use of 
oil revenues). Rather, Gulf capitalism arose as an integral part of the making of the global 
political economy. This means that certain tendencies at the heart of the contemporary 
world market—including the increasing internationalization of production, the immense 
growth of financial markets in recent decades, and the rivalries (and shared interests) be­
tween different global powers—are very much interiorized within Gulf capitalism itself. 
These factors are important not simply to understanding processes of state and class for­
mation in the Gulf. They are also key to moving beyond the “commodity fetishism” of 
much RST—a fetishism that attempts to explain patterns of social development through 
the presence (or absence) of a commodity rather than understanding the significance giv­
en to that commodity by the (global) social relations within which it is embedded.37 It is 
beyond the scope of this chapter to explore these issues in detail, but numerous scholars 
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have contributed important work that helps to illuminate the interaction between the Gulf 
states and accumulation at the global scale.38
Given this context, over the past few decades the Gulf states have witnessed the emer­
gence of large business conglomerates that dominate all economic activities in the re­
gion. Typically these conglomerates are structured around holding companies whose sub­
sidiaries span industrial and manufacturing activities, commerce, retail, and finance. 
They are controlled by influential families (often drawn from the older merchant class) or 
by members of the ruling families themselves. The origins of these conglomerates are 
most often linked to the arrival of oil industries and the early urbanization of the Gulf 
states, including the provision of services to foreign multinationals, the laying of 
pipelines, and construction of buildings and other infrastructure. In all of these sectors, 
business opportunities were heavily dependent on the provision of state contracts and 
other forms of state support (such as joint investments with state-controlled firms or ac­
cess to cheap land). In this manner, early capital accumulation in the Gulf was closely 
linked to the emergence of the state itself.
In the contemporary period, it is useful to analyze the activities of this class through 
three interconnected circuits: productive, commercial, and financial.39 The first of these 
is naturally centered on the hydrocarbon industry and its derivative products. While up­
stream ownership of oil resources remains overwhelmingly in the hands of the state and 
ruling families, privately owned conglomerates have become increasingly involved in 
downstream industries over recent years. These industries include the production of en­
ergy-dependent commodities such as steel, aluminium, and cement, as well as petrochem­
ical manufacture. In addition to this, the construction industry—particularly given the 
Gulf’s remarkable real estate and infrastructure boom of the last decade—remains a core 
activity within the productive circuit.
Profit-making opportunities in the commercial circuit are largely connected to the posses­
sion of rights to import and distribute foreign commodities—automobiles, food stuffs, 
technology, basic consumer goods, and so forth. In all of the Gulf states, these agency 
rights form a lucrative source of income for the largest conglomerates. Because agency 
rights are granted by the state, there is a tight connection between accumulation oppor­
tunities in this circuit and proximity to the ruling family. Frequently, business groups con­
trol both agency and distribution rights and simultaneously hold ownership stakes in the 
outlets in which they are sold (such as shopping centers and malls).
Each of these sectors is linked through financial markets that redirect capital within and 
between different corporate groups and economic activities. Nationally owned banks typi­
cally incorporate representatives of large conglomerates on their boards and amongst 
their largest shareholders. These are closely linked to state pension funds and other in­
vestment authorities, which provide a further mechanism for shifting capital flows origi­
nating in the hydrocarbon sector into other circuits of accumulation. Moreover, the last 
decade has seen the emergence of new financial institutions such as private equity com­
panies, Islamic finance, and other investment firms. As with traditional banking struc­
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tures, a mix of state and private Gulf capital dominates these new forms of finance capi­
tal.
These three circuits of accumulation intersect most starkly within the real estate sector, 
and thus help to explain the striking prominence of new malls, towers, and residential 
blocks that compete to exceed one another in size and extravagance.40 Not only does this 
expansion of the real estate sector provide a constant stream of work for construction 
companies, it also reinforces and bolsters retail and commercial activities. This is one of 
the reasons why the recent real estate boom has been so heavily centered on malls and 
the marketing of the Gulf as a premiere destination for shopping. Moreover, the real es­
tate boom has been a key destination for financial surpluses, confirming that the Gulf has 
been no exception to the increasing entanglement of financial and real estate markets 
within contemporary capitalism.41 Accompanying these processes is a reworking of the 
Gulf urban space, characterized by privatized and fragmented enclaves that market 
tourist, financial, residential, and shopping activities to select participants. As Rami Da­
her has perceptively commented, this neoliberal reimagining of the Arab urban space is 
centered on building “gated communities with practices of inclusion and exclusion”—lo­
cations that deny entry to the vast majority while aiming to provide dreams of “constant 
play” for local and foreign elites.42 This process is not confined to the Gulf itself; numer­
ous scholars have noted the ways in which the urban development of cities such as Am­
man, Beirut, and Cairo are in large part following similar trajectories.43
A further characteristic of Gulf capital needs to be noted here—the increasing tendency 
towards its cross-border expansion. At one level, this internationalization of capital can 
be seen within the Gulf itself, partly enabled by the regional integration project embodied 
in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). This includes cross-border Gulf investments in ar­
eas such as petrochemicals, construction, and finance; the establishment of subsidiaries 
in neighboring Gulf states; share ownership on the regional stock markets; and the incor­
poration of numerous Gulf states within a single conglomerate’s agency rights. Most ad­
vanced in this regard are private equity firms, where corporate structures are typically 
characterized by ownership from a variety of different Gulf investors. This international­
ization of Gulf capital within the GCC does not mean the amelioration of national rivalries 
in the Gulf—indeed, it is a sharply hierarchical process largely dominated by a Saudi–UAE 
axis—but it does mean that conceptions of state/class relations in the Gulf need to move 
beyond nationally centered frames of analysis.
Moreover, the internationalization of Gulf capital is also notable throughout the wider 
Arab world. This feature of the regional scale became increasingly prominent during the 
first decade of the twenty-first century, with a growing proliferation of cross-border in­
vestments by both Gulf conglomerates and state-owned investment firms. According to 
figures from the World Bank, investments originating in the Gulf reached more than one-
third of total foreign investments in the Middle East in 2008, surpassing North America, 
Europe, and Asia.44 Most of these Gulf-based investments went to Jordan, Egypt, 
Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria.45 Indeed, in these five countries, more than half of total 
global investments came from the GCC states during the period between 2003 and 2008. 
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These figures reveal an important characteristic of the recent political economy of the 
Arab world: neoliberal reform has been accompanied by the increasing penetration of 
Gulf-based capital into national class structures.
Emerging from this account of the structure and moments of accumulation of Gulf capital 
are two important features that challenge the analytical assumptions of Weberian ap­
proaches to the Gulf state. The first is that Gulf ruling families—while clearly dominating 
state power—should be viewed as the central, organizing core of the Gulf capitalist class 
itself, rather than as simply the locus of political power. There is no strict dividing line be­
tween capital and state in this regard. Many individuals from ruling families occupy posi­
tions within the state apparatus as well as their own private business interests—or simul­
taneously act in both “private” and “public” capacities. The avowed autonomy or indepen­
dence of the Gulf state from class disappears when viewed from this perspective.
Second, the capitalist class needs to be seen as broader than simply the ruling families. 
While the latter may constitute the dominant, central core of capital, there also exists a 
wider layer of large conglomerates drawn from older merchant families and other newer 
social groups. These conglomerates—like the ruling families themselves—have formed in 
close symbiosis with the state. Much of this process is acknowledged by traditional analy­
ses of the Gulf—land grants, provision of agency rights, joint ventures with state-owned 
conglomerates, and the like—but the key point is to recenter analytical primacy on the 
class relations underpinning capital. The Gulf is not an anomaly within capitalist states in­
ternationally, in which a “weak” capitalist class is arrayed against a “strong, independent 
state.” Rather, the nature of state power in the Gulf is reflective and supportive of a pow­
erful capitalist class—consisting of both ruling families and a wider network of large con­
glomerates.
The Question of Migrant Labor
Furthermore, an analytical emphasis on processes of class formation in the Gulf acts to il­
luminate the centrality of labor migration to the political economy of oil in the region. Ac­
cording to the most recent statistics, the percentage of non-nationals has reached a re­
markable 48% of the Gulf’s 49 million-strong total population.46 In the labor force this 
proportion is even higher—ranging from between 56 to 82% of the employed population 
in Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, and Kuwait, to around 93–94% in Qatar and the UAE.47
Throughout the entire Gulf, 70% of the total employed population is made up of non-na­
tionals48—the largest proportion of migrant workers in any country or region in the 
world. The vast majority of this migrant labor force—around 88% of all foreign workers—
is found in the Gulf’s private sector.49 Collectively, the GCC is the destination of more mi­
grants than any other region in the Global South, and for this reason many neighboring 
countries are highly dependent on remittance flows that originate in the Gulf.
A distinctive structure has developed to manage the deployment and control of these 
workers. This includes the notorious kafala system, a work visa arrangement that essen­
tially binds the migrant to a sponsor (known as a kafeel) and prevents them from seeking 
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work elsewhere. This system is not simply a means of disciplining labor; it is also critical 
to the ways in which Gulf citizenry are incorporated into their societies. Because the right 
to be a kafeel is provided by the state and becomes a property right of the employer, it 
creates a situation in which Gulf citizens are delegated the right to control the entry and 
employment of a migrant. In this manner, the surveillance and control of migrant labor is 
“subcontracted” by the state to individual citizens and businesses.50 This provides a prof­
itable income source for citizens (through the sale of permits), and also situates Gulf citi­
zenry as an integral part of the state’s disciplining of labor.51 Moreover, competition be­
tween citizens over access to kafeel rights helps to generate a further process of vertical 
segmentation within society, encouraging the profession of loyalty and allegiance to the 
ruling family.52
The control over migrant labor is further enhanced through laws that prevent migrant 
workers from organizing collectively and systematically exclude them from the limited po­
litical and civil rights enjoyed by citizenry. One important illustration of this is the restric­
tion on movement and residence within the country. Low-paid migrant workers are fre­
quently housed in specially designed labor camps with their movement to and from work 
organized through employer-provided transportation.53 These kinds of mobility restric­
tions are also an outcome of economic barriers, with worker accommodation consciously 
located far away from citizen or tourist areas. At times these restrictions on residence are 
legally enforced—in 2011, for example, Qatari authorities prohibited male migrant work­
ers (mostly involved in construction) from living in established residential areas.54 Female 
domestic workers are particularly subject to control over movement, as they typically live 
with their employer who may bar them from leaving the house. Indeed, one scholar has 
noted that close to one-half of all domestic workers she interviewed in the UAE had never 
left the houses of their employees unaccompanied.55
Taken together, these processes enable a profound exploitation of labor that includes dan­
gerous and low-paid working conditions, very long hours of work, and the legally sanc­
tioned possibility of arrest and deportation in the case of any labor protest. Minimum 
wages do not exist in the private sector (where most migrants are found) and huge wage 
differentials are present between citizen and non-citizen labor—even more pronounced if 
non-wage benefits are included (such as access to education, health, and housing).56 In 
some sectors, particularly domestic work, wages are even linked to the national origin of 
the migrant. This exploitation is accompanied by a heavily racialized discourse that em­
phasizes the ever-present “threat” that migrants pose to the Gulf.57
In several key ways, this class structure is essential to how Gulf capitalism is able to re­
produce itself. It has, for example, directly underpinned the accumulation of the conglom­
erates described above through the supply of a highly controlled and cheap labor force. 
Once again, construction and real estate is key in this regard—the vast proliferation of 
“mega projects” that sustain the activities of many of these conglomerates depends criti­
cally on the supply of migrant labor. Moreover, a highly precarious migrant workforce has 
enabled the Gulf to deal with numerous economic crises, such as that which occurred fol­
lowing the collapse of the real-estate bubble in Dubai in 2009–2010. By shutting down re­
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al-estate projects, slowing the hiring of new workers, and deporting workers back to their 
home countries, the UAE was able to partially ameliorate the worst aspects of the crisis 
itself—spatially displacing it onto sending countries dependent on the labor markets of 
the Gulf.58 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this class structure has acted to block 
the emergence of any significant indigenous labor movements that could challenge the 
obduracy of the Gulf monarchies and state system—indeed, this is one of the key reasons 
why the Gulf’s labor structure developed in the way that it did.59 In contrast, therefore, to 
the causal link that some versions of RST draw between the lack of taxation and pres­
sures for political change, this perspective points to the centrality of class relations in un­
derstanding the nature of autocracy in the Gulf.
All of these observations highlight the importance of locating migrant labor at the core of 
an understanding of the political economy of oil in the Gulf. The development of the Gulf’s 
economies cannot be adequately theorized through looking solely at the deployment of oil 
revenues, the internecine rivalries of royal families, or the institutional configurations and 
policies of the Gulf state. Both state and capital in the Gulf fully depend on the presence 
of a transient, precarious, and highly exploitable class of migrant workers drawn from nu­
merous states across the globe. Their occluded status in the literature is symptomatic of 
the ways in which arrangements of power are naturalized or obfuscated within much aca­
demic work. This is significant not simply for relations of power in the Gulf itself; the tra­
jectory of global capitalism would likely have taken a radically different path if the Gulf 
had not rested on the exploitation of a temporary, transit work force.
Conclusion: Emerging Questions and Future 
Paths
The arguments made above are naturally not meant to deny the criticality of oil revenues 
to the ways in which Gulf capitalism reproduces itself. Petrodollars have both under­
pinned the development of capital and state in the Gulf, and permitted the emergence of 
a labor market that depends so crucially on migrant workers. The point, however, is to re­
focus attention on Gulf capitalism as a totality—where institutions are seen as social 
forms that reflect and mediate relations of class power. Seen in this light, political econo­
my accounts of the Gulf can avoid a type of “commodity fetishism,” which posits determi­
nate and causal conclusions simply from the availability of oil rents as such, towards an 
analysis much more concerned with tracing how forms of class and state power in the 
Gulf developed through a mutually reinforcing process fully embedded in the develop­
ment of the global economy.
From this perspective, the precipitous drop in the global price of oil in the latter part of 
2014 raises an important series of issues for understanding the political economy of the 
Gulf. Numerous observers have proffered competing explanations for this price decline—
ranging from the Gulf’s interest in driving high-cost US producers of shale oil out of the 
market, oversupply and decreased global demand stemming from economic weaknesses 
in Asia, and US–Saudi collusion to undermine geopolitical rivals such as Iran, Venezuela, 
Capital, Labor, and State: Rethinking the Political Economy of Oil in the 
Gulf
Page 12 of 21
PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights 
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in 
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
Subscriber: School of Oriental and African Studies; date: 07 June 2019
and Russia.60 Regardless of the precise cause, it is certain that the Gulf will continue to 
be a pivotal focus of global fault lines—particularly the political and economic rivalries 
between Asia and the United States. For this reason, there is an important need for schol­
ars to explore more deeply the ways in which these rivalries (and the shared interests of 
global powers) are embodied in political economy relations between the Gulf and differ­
ent zones of the world market. This includes questions such as the eastward shifting pat­
terns of the Gulf’s trade and financial linkages, cross-border ownership and investment 
flows in oil and other industries, the growth of the Gulf as a key headquarters of global Is­
lamic financial institutions and of new Islamic finance instruments, the impending open­
ing of several Gulf stock markets to foreign investment, the relationship between mili­
tarism, petrodollar recycling, and international arms sales, and the prominence of emerg­
ing global industries in Gulf development strategies (such as medical tourism, education 
cities, sustainable energy, and integrated global logistics zones). All of these questions 
are intimately connected to the nature of class and state formation discussed above.
The oil price drop has also brought into focus the ongoing viability of the Gulf’s ubiqui­
tous “mega-projects”—new cities, airports, logistics zones, hydrocarbon projects, and so 
forth—which continued to expand even in the wake of the 2008–2009 global crisis. Over 
the last six years, these projects have formed important investment opportunities for both 
Gulf and international companies in the context of ongoing global stagnation. A January 
2015 announcement that Shell was not moving ahead with a massive $6.4 billion petro­
chemical project in Qatar—following similar multi-billion-dollar cancellations by Qatar Pe­
troleum in September 2014 and the Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) in Octo­
ber 2014—illustrates the potential impact of the oil price slump on the Gulf’s continued 
economic expansion.61 Projects such as these provide numerous lucrative contract oppor­
tunities for a range of Gulf-based companies, and any widespread and prolonged disrup­
tion will likely pose significant problems for the conglomerates discussed above.
Petrodollar surpluses are important not solely for the business opportunities they present. 
As this chapter has noted, hydrocarbon revenues have enabled Gulf states to bind citizen 
populations to ruling families through the use of generous subsidies around food, energy, 
housing, and other social services. In the wake of the 2011 Arab uprisings—and the out­
break of protests in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Kuwait—an increase in this state 
spending was an important mechanism throughout which Gulf states attempted to insu­
late themselves from the wider regional uprisings. Although the so-called “break-even” 
price of oil remains relatively low in the Gulf compared to other global oil producers (no­
tably Venezuela, Russia, and Iran), there is wide regional variation found throughout the 
Gulf—estimated to range from $50–60/barrel in Qatar and Kuwait to just under $100/bar­
rel in Saudi Arabia and the UAE.62 Given the significance of the latter two countries to 
the GCC as a whole, a prolonged downturn in the price of oil could have a substantial im­
pact on social stability in the Gulf over the long-term.63
Budget sustainability is closely connected to the ongoing reality of social exclusion and 
poverty among some sections of Gulf citizenry. In Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, rising levels 
of youth unemployment (around 30% in both countries) raises the possibility of social 
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protest following any significant reduction in social spending. Given the structural impor­
tance of migrant labor to the Gulf it is very difficult for governments to substantially ad­
dress these unemployment levels, despite the professed aim to shift reliance away from 
migrants towards a citizen-based labor force. These issues are particularly accentuated 
by the demographic profile of Gulf populations—over half of the region is aged under 
25.64 Levels of unemployment and poverty, moreover, frequently correlate with religious 
and sectarian differences—the political implications of this are significant in countries 
such as Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. In this context, any long-term drop in the oil price ac­
companied by further downturn in global economic conditions means that the question of 
migrant labor remains essential. Previous crises have pointed to the ways in which mi­
grants in the Gulf have borne the most severe impact of these moments, and the likeli­
hood of increased repression of labor is immanent in any attempt by Gulf states to resolve 
a potential crisis. There have been several recent precursors of this, including the mass 
deportation of over 250,000 migrants from Saudi Arabia between November 2013 and 
January 2014, equivalent to nearly 3% of the country’s migrant workforce.65 At least 
three people died in the wake of the expulsions, with tens of thousands of migrants relo­
cated to makeshift and poorly equipped detention camps.66 At the same time, migrant 
workers across the Gulf have engaged in numerous strikes and other forms of action de­
spite the heavy structural barriers noted above.67 Alongside these labor actions, new ex­
amples of international solidarity have emerged with migrants in the Gulf.68
All of these dimensions of the Gulf political economy bear deeply on our understanding of 
the wider Middle East. The Gulf’s dominant position in the regional political situation—as 
well as the growing influence of Gulf businesses in key Arab economic sectors such as re­
al estate, finance, construction, retail, and agribusiness—is a striking feature of the con­
temporary moment. For this reason, there is an urgent need to position the Gulf as a core 
component of the study of political economy in the Middle East. Processes of class and 
state formation in the Gulf have significant implications not just for the Gulf region—they 
will continue to decisively shape the future trajectory of the Arab world for many years to 
come.
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